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1.  The macro-economic picture 
The eurozone is in recession and will show 
negative growth in 2012; GDP will fall sharply in 
Greece and Portugal, and there is substantial risk 
that Spain and Italy will follow suit (the 
Commission’s recent forecasts seem overly 
optimistic and complacent; the IMF is more 
downbeat). But fiscal policies are uniformly 
restrictive throughout the eurozone and much of 
the Union, and the hopes that fiscal consolidation 
could spur growth by improving household and 
business confidence are not materialising. In 
reality, domestic demand has been hit too hard 
by fiscal consolidation, and investment 
throughout the Union remains well below pre-
crisis levels. Credit is tight due to the 
deteriorating quality of borrowers and the 
ongoing deleveraging in banking. 
A specific difficulty in this regard is the 
persistently large current payment imbalances 
within the Union and the eurozone in particular, 
reflecting substantial competitive (wage and cost) 
imbalances. To a large extent, the deficits of 
France, Italy and Spain are just the counterpart of 
surpluses in Germany (6% of GDP in 2011) and 
other Continental and Nordic economies. The 
financing burden of these imbalances has mostly 
fallen on official channels, i.e. the ECB and official 
assistance programmes, as private financing from 
the surplus countries has dried up.  
Coordination of macro-economic and structural 
policies designed to reduce payments imbalances 
have of course been a main tenet of G-20 
deliberations, but so far with little result. In 
practice, there seems to be little room to ‘export’ 
our imbalances to the rest of the world, at least 
not any time soon, owing to the large deficit 
reduction efforts and aggressive monetary 
expansion in the United States; slow adjustment 
of the surplus in China and other emerging 
countries; and the strength of the euro in foreign 
exchange markets. So, much of the adjustment 
will have to happen inside the eurozone.  
In its Annual Growth Survey 2012, the 
Commission had advocated “pursuing 
differentiated growth-friendly fiscal 
consolidation” and had encouraged countries 
with strong budgetary positions to let their 
budgetary policy play “their counter-cyclical and 
stabilising role, as long as medium-term fiscal 
sustainability is not put at risk”. In their recent 
Survey of the German economy, the OECD was 
outspoken and called for Germany to strengthen 
domestic demand by “improving competition- 
enhancing framework conditions for investment 
and innovation in Germany’s domestic sector. 
This includes lowering the strict regulation in 
some services sectors”. 
But policies have not been adjusted as a result, 
and there is no trace of this Commission 
recommendation in the Council statement on 
growth of January 30th.  
The Commission has also just published its first 
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new Procedure for the prevention and correction 
of macroeconomic imbalances. Much of the 
document is devoted to the analysis of internal 
imbalances of the member states, while the 
contribution that may come from growth and 
adjustment from a reduction of “large and 
sustained current account surpluses” is played 
down (less than half a page in a 20-page 
document, promising further attention to the 
problem in coming months).  
The fact remains that if the burden of adjustment 
falls largely or solely on deficit countries, this will 
further depress demand and economic activity 
everywhere, including surplus countries that will 
see their net exports to the rest of the Union fall. 
There is also an urgent need to restore private 
capital flows from the centre to the periphery, but 
this largely depends on restoring confidence in 
the sustainability of sovereign debts and payment 
imbalances – which cannot happen, in the end, 
without a return to sustained growth.      
2.  The growth letter  
The recent letter to Presidents Van Rompuy and 
Barroso signed by twelve heads of government is 
a most important and timely initiative. It builds 
on the restoration of confidence already 
underway in financial markets, thanks to the new 
policy directions in Italy and Spain and the recent 
agreement on the fiscal compact. Significantly, it 
lines up together the prime ministers of three 
Triple A countries, the UK and those of Italy, 
Spain and Poland, and many other countries in 
and out of the euro. Let’s hope that it will open 
the way to a shift in the agenda of the European 
Council to stronger common policies for growth.  
The letter demands a significant broadening in 
economic philosophy: “The crisis we are facing, it 
says, is also a crisis of growth … Action is needed 
to modernise our economies, build greater 
competitiveness and correct macroeconomic 
imbalances. We need to restore confidence, among 
citizens, businesses and financial markets, in 
Europe’s ability to grow strongly and sustainably and 
maintain its share of global prosperity”. 
The Internal Market is central (not surprisingly, 
given the role played by the Italian prime 
minister in the initiative). Top of the list is the 
implementation of the Services Directive, the 
long-delayed implementation of energy 
liberalisation, an acceleration of the digital 
internal market – that holds great promise in 
breaking national fiefdoms in commercial 
distribution and financial services – and a serious 
attack on red tape, as yet largely unrealised both 
at Community and national level.  
On the labour markets, the emphasis is on 
improving labour market participation, an issue 
already under consideration by the Council, but 
also on improving labour mobility across borders 
by making progress on the preservation of 
pension rights and “reducing the number” of 
regulated professions.  
While for skilled professionals the main 
impediment is in inadequate mechanisms for the 
recognition of qualifications, for less skilled 
workers, the key to an integrated labour market is 
the establishment of a common European 
platform of protection including a minimum 
wage system (set in proportion to national wages 
rather than as absolute numbers).  
And, of course, there is an appeal to strengthen 
research and innovation policies: the main 
obstacle here has been the poorly managed and 
techno-nationalistic research policies of the 
member states, which still resist any serious 
coordination of priorities and the shift to a fully 
competitive system for the selection of projects.   
The proposals are not new but there is a new 
sense of urgency: the key suggestion is “reinforce 
governance and raise the standards of 
implementation”, not only by setting firm 
deadlines but also by using all Community 
powers to encourage the member states to 
proceed. The Commission is explicitly asked to 
increase pressure on the member states, after 
many years of integration fatigue that were rather 
suggesting caution.  
The twelve heads of government have stopped 
short of asking for a most important 
strengthening of decision-making, which is to 
make binding all commitments on the 
implementation of the internal market under the 
procedures of the common policy guidelines of 
Article 121 of the TFEU, including the sanctions 
for failing to implement Commission 
recommendations. In this manner the member 
states could no longer shirk their responsibilities 
and would be made more directly accountable 
before the European Council for their 
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As familiar as they may sound, the twelve prime 
ministers’ recommendations entail a stepped-up 
political commitment by the European Parliament 
and the Commission, and serious action to 
deliver by all the member states – a change of 
pace that is long overdue. They would open the 
way to a strong recovery of investment that has 
been lagging in no small measure due to the 
obstacles and barriers that still impede a well- 
functioning internal market.  
3.  Specific initiatives to raise investment 
spending at the EU level 
To some extent, pushing the accelerator on the 
internal market and the other initiatives that have 
been mentioned may be effective in stimulating 
investment and domestic demand, and in due 
course could raise personal income and 
consumption. However, we must ask ourselves if 
t h i s  i s  e n o u g h  t o  i n c r e a s e  g r o w t h  a n d  a v o i d  a  
vicious circle of budgetary retrenchment, leading 
to falling activity, larger deficits and yet more 
demands for retrenchment. Greece may already 
be in such a situation. More broadly, under 
current and projected growth rates, restoration of 
sustainable budgetary positions will continue to 
require painful sacrifices, economic and social, 
and place the political system under increasing 
stress over time.   
Now that budgetary positions are improving 
throughout the eurozone and the Union, why 
shouldn’t the European Council consider 
launching a new growth initiative, centered on 
mobilising vast resources at EU level for 
investment in worthy projects of common interest 
Europe-wide? 
The initiative should involve at least three areas: 
(i)  The acceleration in the disbursement of 
cohesion and structural funds; in this context 
it is also important to approve the reduction 
to 25% in the share of matching funds to be 
deployed at national level; 
(ii) A large increase in the capital of the EIB, 
which would thus be able to expand its 
lending substantially;  
(iii) The immediate launch of the Commission 
Project Bond initiative, with its strong 
potential to mobilise private capital for 
infrastructure investment for the internal 
markets; and more in general full exploration 
of all the ways and means whereby the Union 
budget may be mobilised and levered to make 
more resources available for member state 
and private investment.    
The European Council should also make good its 
commitment last summer to establish strong 
growth programmes assisted by additional 
resources in countries that are struggling to meet 
their debt obligations under very onerous 
adjustment programmes. A key goal here should 
be to make sure that there is light at the end of the 
tunnel, lest at some stage the unbearable social 
and political costs of adjustment lead to a 
breakdown of the domestic political system and 
disorderly default.   CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, Place du Congrès 1, B‐1000 Brussels, Belgium  
Tel: 32 (0)2 229 39 11 • Fax: 32 (0)2 219 41 51 • www.ceps.eu • VAT: BE 0424.123.986 
 
 
ABOUT CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is widely recognised as 
the most experienced and authoritative think tank operating in the European Union today. CEPS 
acts as a leading forum for debate on EU affairs, distinguished by its strong in-house research 
capacity, complemented by an extensive network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
•  Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the challenges 
facing Europe today, 
•  Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
•  Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process, and 
•  Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
•  Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
•  Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
•  An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 